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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE ST A T'E OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
WII.JLIAM FRANCE GILLEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8392 
Brief of Respondent 
ST1\TEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent adopts in substance appellant's pre-
liminary statement as being substantially correct, but 
adds the follo·w·ing in order that the Court may con-
veniently determine the validity of the claim made by 
appellant through the prosecution of this appeal. 
.. According to the record, the district attorney ob-
jected a total of three times during the cross-examination 
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of the witness Samuelson by appellant's counsel. (R. 62, 
71.) Of these three objections, not one 'vas sustained . 
.._;\_ppellant 's right to face a witness who testifies against 
him at the trial, and cross-examine him, was never denied 
nor restricted. 
To the contrary, the trial court encouraged defense 
counsel to proceed in his cross-examination and show 
how or 'vhy the witness Samuelson was biased and 
prejudiced against the appellant. (R. 71.) The record 
makes cl~ar that during the cross-examination of Samuel-
s.on, he had a difficult time understandi~g the questions 
and associating them to a particular part of his experi-
ence related to the charges which had been filed against 
the appellant. It was not unusual for appellant's counsel 
to have to ask the questions two, three and four times. 
Even after seeing how slow the witness was in compre-
hending his questions, defense counsel made no effort 
to call to his attention the fact that, as counsel, he. be-
lieved, if he really did, that the witness Samuelson had 
been offered preferential treatment in return for his 
testimony. 
Prior to the offer of the transcript as evidence (R. 
104), ~hich transcript appellant claims would have 
impeached the witness, there "\\7as no attempt made to 
discover or disclose by or through cross-examination 
whether any leniency or immunity had been received, 
promised, offered, expected or hoped for by the witness . 
. The only reference made by appellant's counsel to any 
such condition was one vague question about the witness 
being '' * * * expected to cooperate with the State in 
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this matter, * * *" during the following cross-examina-
tion: 
'' Q. At the time of sentencing under that 
matter did you have a conversation with the 
court~ 
''A. No. The date I went up for sentence~ 
· "Q. That's right. 
''A. Yes. I had no conversation at all with 
the court that day. 
"Q. Pardon me~ 
"A. Didn't have no talking with the court at 
all that day. 
'' Q. Did the court talk to you and admonish 
you? 
''A. Told me to put it over for a week. 
''Q. I mean at the time of your sentencing, 
did you have a conversation with the court~ 
"A. No. I didn't. 
''Q. You did not. Maybe I can clear up what 
I mean. At the time that you were put on pro-
bation, did you have a conversation with the 
court~ 
''A. The day I was put on probation he talked 
to me, yes. 
''Q. And could you tell me what the court 
told you on that day? 
"MR. ANDERSON: I think that's immate-
rial. 
''MR. HATCH: I think it is proper to shoto 
bias and prejudice, Your Honor. 
"THE COURT: On the part of the court or 
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on the part of the 1oitness? If on- the pa1~t of the 
witness, I will let you go ahead. 
":11:R. HATCH: On the part of the witness, 
Your Honor. 
''THE COURT: Go ahead then. Let's see. 
'' Q. 'Vhat did the court say to you on that 
day' 
''A. On that day they told me they was going 
to put me on probation, that I had to report back 
here to the judge on the 26th of this month. 
"Q. And, as a matter of fact, weren't you 
told on that day by the court that_ you were ex-
pected to cooperate with the state in this matter1 
''A. I did not. They did not say nothing to 
me. 
"MR. HATCH: Thank you. That's all." 
(R. 71, 72.) (Emphasis added.) 
Defense counsel voluntarily stopped the examination 
at this point. The witness was never recalled. There 
was no attempt made to lay a foundation for the intro-
duction of the independent evidence appellant now 
claims would have impeached the State's witness by 
showing his bias or prejudice toward the appellant . 
.. A.ppellant "ras found guilty of uttering a forged 
check, and not of forgery (R. 144). His o"\vn testimony 
discloses he had knowledge that the check delivered to 
Mr. McDermaid, manager of the 0. P. Skaggs Store, 
was forged. 
(By Mr. Anderson, District Attorney) 
"Q. Well, you said that you saw these checks 
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being made out I understood in the restaurant-
" .1~. That's right. 
'' Q. -in Ogden. Is that right? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. And you knew that the girl making them 
out wasn't a man by the name of G. F. Stevensen, 
didn't you' 
''A. I did. 
"Q. Because you had met Stevensen, hadn't 
you? 
''A. That's right. 
'' Q. And you knew at that time these checks 
had come from his store, didn't you~ 
''A. I didn't know where they came from. 
'' Q. Well, you read on them, didn't you 1 
''A. I didn't kno'v where they come from 
because Samuelson popped them up up there the 
first time. 
'' Q. Well, you read the title at the top, didn't 
you? 
"A. Huh' 
'' Q. You read the name at the top-
'' Q. You read the name at the top of the 
exhibits where it says ''Good Housekeeping Cen-
ter"' 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. You did? 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. Then you knew where the check had 
come from' 
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''A. Yes. 
'' Q. And you knew she was not a man by the 
name of G. F. Stevensent 
''A. That's right. 
'' Q. ~1\_nd so \vhen you were in Skaggs store 
and you were asked to endorse this check, you 
did so \vithout telling Mr. McDerma.id that fact, 
didn't you~ Didn't you 1 
''A. Yes. Go ahead. 
''Q. And you knew you weren't George Nel-
son, didn't you¥ 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. Now, you said that Mr. Samuelson wa.s 
\Vorse off than you, wasn't he? 
''A. That's right. 
'' Q. So you carried his groceries out to the 
car? 
''A. No, I didn't carry them. 
'' Q. You didn't 1 
"A. No. 
''Q. What did you take out to the car! 
''A. I didn't take nothing only myself. 
'' Q. Only yourself¥ 
"~-\. Yes. " 
(R. 127, 128.) 
'' Q. When did you first see the three checks 
that you have mentioned? 
''A. The first time I seen three checks was at 
Ogden, Utah, in the cafeteria. 
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"Q. Is that the time when this girl - was she 
a waitress, was she~ 
"A y . 
. es, s1r. 
''Q. Is that the time when she made out the 
three checks~'' 
"A. That's right. 
'' Q. Did she make out all three of them~ 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. At that time~ 
"A. Yes sir. 
'' Q. In your presence~ 
"A. I was sitting off to the side eating a 
little bite to eat, and Mr. Samuelson had the 
checks fixed and folded them up and put them 
in his pocket. 
'' Q. Then it is your testimony that this girl-
you don't know her name~ 
"A. No, I don't. 
'' Q. That she made out those three checks? 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. And Exhibits 1 and 2 are two of those 
checks~ 
"A. Well, that is what I figured they are, yes, 
because they are both made out looks to me like 
the same hand,vriting. 
'' Q. So it is your testimony that Exhibits 1 
and 2 look like to you the same handwriting~ 
''A. They certainly do. 
'' Q. And they were both made by this girl~ 
''A. I am pretty sure. There were three 
checks made out there." (R. 129, 130.) 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW AP-
PELLANT TO PRODUCE CERTAIN INDEPEN-
DENT EVIDENCE WAS NOT ERROR, FOR IT WAS 
WITHIN THE COURT'S DISCRETION TO SORE-
FUSE WHEN THERE HAD NOT BEEN A PROPER 
FOUNDATION LAID PRIOR TO ITS OFFER. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING THE 
INTRODUCTION OF CERTAIN INDEPENDENT 
EVIDENCE, IT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO AP-
PEL·LANT'S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS FOR APPEL-
LANT'S TESTI1fONY DISCLOSED THAT HE 
KNEW THE CHECI{ WAS FORGED, THEREBY 
]-,URNISHING THE JURY SUFFICIENT EVI-
DENCE UPON WHICH TO FIND APPELLANT 
GUILTY OF UTTERING A FORGED INSTRUMENT . 
. A.RGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW AP-
PELLANT TO PRODUCE CERTAIN INDEPEN-
DENT EVIDENCE vV AS NOT ERROR, FOR IT WAS 
WITHIN ~CI-IE COURT'S DISCRETION TO SORE-
FUSE WHEN THER.E HAD NOT BEEN A PROPER 
FOUNDATION L~L\.ID PRIOR TO ITS OFFER. 
There is no question that the cases cited in appel-
lant's brief speak the la\v as it has been established. 
However, respondent feels that the cases cited therein 
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are not in point and can be distinguished from the issue 
presented by this appeal. 
It is admitted that the testimony of an accomplice 
must be received with caution and be subject to grave 
suspicion. Ho,vever, this kind of testimony is often the 
only evidence the State can produce in criminal matters. 
As a result, it is generally considered to be competent, 
and if, after all the facts and circumstances in evidence 
are considered, such testimony is sufficient to prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury is authorized 
to find a verdict of guilty. If this rule were any different, 
many criminals "'ould go unpunished. State v. Harding, 
161 Wash. 379, 297 P. 167; People v. Kendall, 357 Ill. 
448, 192 N.E. 378. The general rule is broad enough to 
include the testimony of an accomplice even though 
uncorroborated. People v. Kendall, supra; People v. 
Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 194 N.E. 539. 
But the rule has been changed in Utah by statute. 
Our law requires that the testimony of an accomplice 
be corroborated by evidence "* * * which in itself and 
without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice tends 
to connect the defendant with the commission of the 
offense * * *. '' ( 77-31-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.) 
In order to determine if the corroborative evidence is 
sufficient in and of itself to tend to implicate and con-
nect the accused "'ith the commission of the offense 
charged, the testimony of the accomplice should be dis-
regarded; then, if the other testimony and evidence 
properly admitted tends to prove the connection of the 
accused with the crime, it is sufficient. It need not be 
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sufficient to sustain a conviction by itself, but it must 
terid to implicate the accused with the c.rime charged 
and not be consistent with his innocence. State v. Clark, 
3 U. 2d 382, 284 P. 2d 700. 
At appellant's trial, the accomplice, Samuelson, 
testified to certain facts which were corroborated by 
other evidence. There can be little doubt that his testi-
mony vvas corroborated by that of the other witnesses 
on the following facts: 
1. Samuelson took the checks-no dispute 111 the 
testimony of Samuelson and appellant. (R. 57.) 
2. The checks were apparently made out by the 
appellant. (R. 57, 60, 67, 90.) 
3. Appellant did not have authority to make out 
the checks. (R. 36, 58.) 
4. Appellant aided in passing the forged check and 
thereby declaring and asserting, directly or indirectly, 
by his re-endorsement that the instrument was good. (R. 
48, 66, 114, 127' 128.) 
5. Appellant received the change (money) given 
for the forged check cashed at the 0. P. Skaggs Store. 
(R. 55, 64.) 
Appellant's brief stresses the right of a defendant, 
in a criminal action, to confront an individual who is a 
witness for the State· and to cross-examine him during 
the proceedings. And, it is contended that this is 
especial~y true when the witness was an accomplice of 
the defendant in the commission of the offense he is 
10 
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charged with. This rule of law has been settled in Utah. 
There is no question but that the defendant in a criminal 
proceeding has an absolute right and not only a mere 
privilege to cross-examine such a witness. State v. Zola;n-
takis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044; Sta.te v. Ba,rretta, 47 
Utah 479, 155 P. 343. 
Respondent· further accepts the principals of law 
that require the jury to see and have a chance to study 
the demeanor of the witness during cross-examination 
in order to evaluate the truth or falsity of his testimony; 
that a witness may be cross--examined as to whether or 
not he received any consideration for his testimony; 
that it is error to refuse such cross-examination even 
though the witness has only a hope of leniency; that 
the witness may be cross-examined as to what reward 
has been already received and the facts surrounding the 
award of leniency or immunity. 
Though this is the law, it is difficult to see what 
application it has to the issue presented by this appeal. 
It has no bearing upon the introduction of the indepen-
dent evidence which it is claimed would have impeached 
a particular witness, for the right of cross-examination 
was never refused the appellant during his trial. 
The question of whether any leniency or immunity 
has been afforded an accomplice in return for his testi-
mony at the trial of his associates is always subject to a 
probing, sifting cross-examination. However, under the 
rules of our courts and because of the very nature of 
the proceedings in the courts, being adversary against 
adversary, it is the duty of the defense counsel to pro-
11 
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ceed and extend the examination into the areas he be-
lieves will best benefit his client. It is not incumbent 
upon a court to make sure the attorneys that appear 
before it perform one hundred per cent in the applica-
tion of every rule of law within its knowledge and under-
standing. 
The point of respondent's argument is simply this-
during the trial, appellant's counsel didn't take advan-
tage of his right to cross-examine the witness as to what 
leniency or immunity he may have received, been prom-
ised, expected or hoped for. 
After the trial court had given its express permis-
sion to appellant's counsel to proceed in his attempt to 
disclose the bias and prejudice claimed to be tainting 
the witness's testimony, counsel stopped after one vague 
question about the court expecting the witness "* * * to 
cooperate with the State in this matter~" No attempt 
was made to associate the remark supposedly made at 
the time the court sentenced the witness with the present 
proceeding in that the witness was to receive preferential 
treatment. Again it is pointed out that defense counsel 
voluntarily stopped his examination at this point and 
appellant 'vas never restricted in his right to cross-
examine the "\vitness Samuelson. 
As stated in Point I of appellant's brief, the real 
issu~ to be considered by this appeal is whether it was 
error to refuse the introduction of certain evidence for 
impeachment of the \Yitness Samuelson. A party is not 
permitted to impeach the credibility of a witness against 
him by the introduction of independent evidence \vhich 
12 
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it is claimed shows an inconsistent statement, hostility, 
prejudice, or interest in the outcome of the case without 
first laying a foundation for the introduction of said 
evidence. The foundation is laid by calling the attention 
of the witness to the statement or act which it is claimed 
'viii show his bias, prejudice, hostility or interest, thus 
giving him an opportunity to admit, deny or explain it. 
State u. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P. 2d 727; Faga.n v. 
Lentz, 156 Cal. 181, 105 P. 951, 20 Ann. Cas. 221 ; see also 
16 A.L.R. 984. 
It is not sufficient merely to ask the witness during 
cross-examination whether certain statements were made 
by him or made in his presence. It is necessary in order 
to lay a sufficient foundation on which to show that a 
'vitness is hostile or biased to directly question him as 
to the precise statements or happenings to be used 
against him and the place where they were alleged to 
have been made. Wright v. State, 153 Ark. 16, 201 S.W. 
1107; State v. Ellsworth, 30 Ore. 145, 47 P. 199; State v. 
McSloy, 127 Mont. 265, 261 P. 2d 663; Willis v. State, 
25·7 Ala. 500, 66 So. 2d 753; McCauley v. Sta.te, 64 Ga. 
App. 509, 71 S.E. 2d 664; People v. Adair, 120 C.A. 2d 
765, 228 P. 2d 336; Galvarn v. State, 129 Tex. Cr. R. 349, 
86 s.w. 2d 228. 
There was no attempt made during the cross-exami-
nation of Samuelson to disclose whether any leniency 
or immunity had been offered, accepted, or hoped for, on 
the part of the witness, nor was it shown that the court's 
comments at the time Samuelson was sentenced had any 
effect upon him whatever. Samuelson was not asked 
13 
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if he felt that his testimony, given at appellant's trial, 
was to be the basis upon which he expected to receive 
probation. 
A careful reading of the cases cited by appellant 
in his brief (excluding the last four) discloses that in 
each instance the right of cross-examination that was 
refused, resulted either after a question pointed specific-
ally at immunity or leniency received, promised, ex-
pected or hoped for, or after an offer of proof directed 
at disclosing the same. 
The case of State v. Barretta, supra, a Utah case, 
is an excellent example. Barretta, an accomplice, was 
asked on cross-examination: 
''Don't you understand that your case is to be 
dismissed if you will testify against the defend-
ants * * * in this case~'' 
In the Barretta case, as in most of the cases cited by 
appellant, the problem of the introduction of independent 
evidence to impeach a particular witness was not in-
volved. On appeal, in each case, the issue involved the 
refusal of the trial court of permission to cross-examine 
one of the state's witnesses about his bias, prejudice, 
hostility or interest in the outcome of the case. Also, 
· the trial court in some of the cases denied the right to 
cross-examine a \vitness concerning immunity or leniency 
and the fact that, though the witness was an accomplice, 
the charge filed against him had not been prosecuted or 
had been dismissed in return for his testimony and help 
in obtaining a conviction of his associates. 
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Consideration should also be given to the fact that 
the disclosure of bias, prejudice or hostility in a witness 
does not exclude his testimony but rather goes only to 
the credibility of the witness. The witness Samuelson 
was labled an accomplice at the very outset of the trial 
and by his own testimony given a little later. Therefore, 
the jury had an opportunity to judge his credibility. 
People v. Simard, 314 Mich. 62.4, 23 N.W. 2d 106. His 
credibility was also placed before the jury to be tested 
and studied when on cross-examination it was disclosed 
that he had a criminal record and had been convicted of 
a felony in Idaho (R. 60). 
Where counsel seeks to discredit a witness by show-
ing bias, hostility, prejudice or interest, he should first 
inquire as to the state of the witness' feelings toward 
the person involved. Carlyle v. State, 85 Ga. App. 223, 
68 S.E. 2d 605. In proving hostility and bias in a witness, 
facts which directly tend to establish it should be resorted 
to, such as threats, quarrels and like circumstances. It is 
also sufficient to show the hostility by reasonable infer-
ence from the circumstances inquired about. State v. 
Belansky, 3 1\tiinn. 246, Gil. 169. 
After all, impeachment is not a central matter and 
the trial judge, though he may not deny a reasonable 
opportunity at any stage to prove the bias of a witness, 
has discretion to control the extent to which the proof 
may go. 
The writers of texts and encyclopedias list many 
cases to prove that the evidence to explain bias or 
hostility, or to explain it away, is or is not admissible. 
15 
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But what these cases really stand for, "Then they arp 
sufficiently well reasoned to reveal their rationale, is 
that the admission or rejection of such evidence lies in 
the discretion of the trial judge. Lau Fook Kan v. United 
States, 9th Cir., 34 Fed. 86, 91; People v. Zugouras, 163 
N.Y. 250, 57 N.E. 465; Priori v. United Sta.tes, 6th Cir., 
6 F. 2d 575; Commonwealth v. Ezell, 212 Pa. 293, 61 A. 
930; State v. Long, 95 Vt. 485, 115 A. 734; State v. Frazer, 
23 S.D. 804, 121 N.W. 790; Bracey v. United States, 142 
F. 2d 85. 
The trial judge has the responsibility of seeing the 
sideshow does not take over the circus. In fact, the 
situation of the present case provides a good example 
for the necessity for permitting the trial judge to exer-
cise considerable discretion in admitting or rejecting 
evidence. He observed the conduct of counsel, the reac-
tions of the witnesses under examination, both direct 
and cross, and the resulting affect upon the jury. In 
other words, he was aware as no appellate court can be, 
of the courtroom psychology and, hence, is in a position 
to determine whether particular testimony should or 
should not be received. Appellate courts have been 
especially unwilling to override the exercise of discre-
tion of trial judges in such circumstances. Williamson v. 
United States, 207 U.S. 425, 28 S.Ct. 163, 52 L.Ed. 278; 
Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U.S. 150, 13 S.Ct. 288, 37 L.Ed. 
278. 
By exercising its discretion to exclude the proffered 
evidence, the court indica ted that, in its considered judg-
ment, the appellant would be best served. The judge felt 
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that such evidence '' ... would have no bearing here and 
would greatly tend to prejudice this jury. If the jury 
thought the court at one time had an opinion, I think 
it would be highly prejudicial.'' (R. 104.) 
Consideration should also be given to the procedural 
effect the introduction of the independent evidence 
·would have had upon the court. To rehabilitate the wit-
ness Samuelson, it would have been necessary to call the 
judge there presiding as a witness. Though the statutes 
of this State allow such (78-24-3, U.C.A. 1953), the gen-
eral view is that expressed in the California case of 
People v. Connors, 77 Cal. App. 438, 246 P. 1072, 157 
A.L.R. 322. That court, in discussing the statute that 
allowed a trial judge to be called as a witness at a hear-
ing over which he was presiding, indicated such was 
within his discretion, that such discretion should never 
be resorted to, and that a trial judge should not become 
a witness except in cases where the circumstances im-
peratively require it. It should be noted that the Cali-
fornia and Utah statutes use the same language. 
As a general proposition, it may be said that the 
weight of authority sustains the view that a presiding 
judge may not temporarily leave the bench and become 
a witness in a case being heard by him. The recent deci-
sions agree that such conduct is improper, although 
there may be a question of whether or not it constitutes 
prejudicial error. Testimony of Judge or Juror, 1945 
Wis. Law Review, p. 248. 
In some cases, the courts have held that where the 
judge, called to the witness stand, is trying the case and 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
his continuance is necessary to a proper trial thereof, 
it is error for him to testify. People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 
374, 11 Am. Rep. 349; State v. Sandquist, 46 Minn. 322, 
178 N.W. 883. 
This rule has been amplified and it has been con-
sidered a fatal error for the presiding judge to testify 
in a criminal case. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 
62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; People v. McDermott, 40 
N.Y.S. 2d 456; State v. Bagwell, 201 S.C. 387, 23 S.E. 2d 
244; Downey v. [T nited States, 91 F. 2d 223. 
In the present case the question of the witness's 
credibility and veracity had been placed before the jury. 
It was shown that the witness was an accomplice in the 
crime; therefore, the jury had a chance to judge his 
credibility. People v. Simard, supra. Also, the jury had 
a second chance to consider the veracity of Samuelson 
when it was shown that he had a criminal record. If the 
independent evidence offered by the appellant had been 
received, it would have diverted the attention of the jury 
to a col]ateral issue, for which there was no foundation 
upon which to judge the character of evidence introduced. 
''Where the effect, even if not the intent, of 
the evidence offered is to divert the attention of 
the jury by a collateral and subordinate issue, the 
matter must always be left largely in the discre-
tion of the judge, and in this case it certainly was 
not abused, as it is clear that there was no solid 
foundation for the charge of hostile bias on the 
part of the \vitness, .whose testimony in the main 
points" * * * [\Vas corroborated by that of the 
other witnesses.] 
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Commonwealth v. Ezell, supra. 
Cross-examination and the introduction of indepen-
dent evidence 'vith respect to appropriate subject of 
inquiry rests in the discretion of the trial court; and it 
is only in cases of clear abuse of such discretion, re-
sulting in manifest prejudice to the complaining party, 
that the reviewing court will interfere. lgo v. State,. ------
Okla. ______ , 267 P. 2d 1082. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING THE 
INTRODUCTION OF CERTAIN INDEPENDENT 
EVIDENCE, IT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO AP-
PELLANT'S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS FOR APPEL-
LANT'S TESTIJ\IIONY DISCLOSED THAT HE 
KNEW THE CHECK WAS FORGED, THEREBY 
FURNISHING THE JURY SUFFICIENT EVI-
DENCE UPON WHICH TO FIND APPELLANT 
GUILTY OF UTTERING A FORGED INSTRUMENT. 
Section 76-26-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, defines 
uttering in the following language : 
''Every person who * * * utters, publishes or 
passes, or attempts to pass, as true or genuine 
any * * * fake, altered, forged or counterfeited 
matters, * * * knowing the same to be false 'X< * * 
with the intent to prejudice, damage or defraud 
any person * * * is guilty of forgery." 
It seems reasonable to say that the inference, that 
a person who utters as genuine a forged instrument had 
knowledge of its forged condition, is particularly war-
ranted where, in addition to his possession and uttering 
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. . 
of the forged instrument, there are accompanying cir-
cumstances 'Yhich are indicative of such knowledge on 
his part, such as, for example, his being named as payee 
or falsely representing himself as the payee or the en-
dorsee, or making other false representations when 
uttering it. (164 A.L.R. 621.) When a person aids in 
passing a forged instrument, he thereby declares and 
asserts, directly and indirectly, that the instrument is 
good. When the forged instrument is uttered, the intent 
to defraud is presumed, Spears v. People, 220 Ill. 72, 77 
N.E. 112, and where a person is actually defrauded, the 
intent to defraud ordinarily becomes conclusive. And, 
it has been held that one's intent is prima facie criminal 
where, in cashing a check, he falsely permitted himself 
to be identified as being the payee, and forged the en-
dorsement of the payee on said check. State v. Vineyard, 
16 l\{ont. 138, 40 P. 173. 
In that case, the court said : 
"If a man goes to a stranger with a check 
made out to another, permits himself to be iden-
tified as the real payee, and secures the amount 
of the check as an accommodation, after making 
a fictitious or forged endorsement thereon, we 
unhesitatingly say that his intent is prima facie 
criminal and to hold otherwise, under the facts 
of this case, is contrary to all logical processes 
of reasoning * * *. '' 
Can there be any doubt about whether appellant 
knew the check ":as forged'~ Of course not. His claim 
of innocent involvement is not worth considering. This 
man was no innocent bystander. On cross-examination 
the fact that appellant had served time in both the Ore-
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gon and Idaho state penitentiaries for forgery was 
brought out for the jury to consider (R. 119, 120.) After 
four different convictions, he certainly must have realized 
and have been fully aware of the criminal nature of the 
act of passing the check by a fictitious or forged endorse-
ment or reendorsement. 
''Evidence of similar forgeries is admissable 
to show a uniform course of acting from which 
guilty knowledge and criminal intent can be in-
ferred. In other words, the evidence of other 
forgeries is admissable not to prove the com-
mission of the crime for which the party is being 
tried, but to prove guilty knowledge and In-
tent * * *." 
State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P. 2d 750. 
Though the above stated rule is sometimes qualified by 
the time lapse between each act of forging or passing a 
forged instrument, it would appear to have application 
in this case. 
By his own testimony, the appellant convicted him-
self. He admits that he knew the checks were not issued 
by the proprietor of the Good Housekeeping Center, nor 
\Vas the authority to make the checks given to anyone 
else, to his knowledge. (R. 126, 127, 128, 129, 130.) His 
story involves a waitress whom, he claims, made out the 
checks. (R. 110, 111.) However, he readily admits she 
couldn't have had the authorization of Mr. G. F. Ste-
vensen, owner of ''Good Housekeeping Center'' to so 
do, nor was she G. F. Stevensen. 
Appellant represented to the manager of the store 
\vhere the check was cashed, that he was George Nelson, 
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the payee named on the check, and at the request of the 
manager re-endorsed the check (R. 48). After the check 
had been cashed, appellant received the change there-
from. This is sufficient to show the intent to defraud 
and the actual defrauding of an individual. 
Throughout the record, the fact is brought out that 
the appellant and his associate had been drinking 
heavily. This is of no consequence for: ''No act com-
mitted while in a. state of voluntary intoxication is less 
criminal by reason of his having been in such conditon.'' 
(76-1-22, U.C.A. 1953.) 
One last comment should be made concerning the 
full effect of the testimony given by Samuelson. There 
was not one material statement made that was not sub-
stantiated by the other witnesses. The only force his 
testimony could lend to the prosecution was to prove 
the actual forging of the checks, and even this was testi-
fied to by the expert who testified on behalf of the State. 
Appellant \Vas not convicted of forgery, but of 
uttering a forged instrument; and, as shown above, the 
evidence produced by the State and the testimony of 
the appellant gave the jury all the evidence, and, in 
considering it, the jury could not have found other than 
it did. 
CONCLUSION 
The· judgment of the court below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
~IAURICE D. JONES 
.._"1ssistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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